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NOTES
CONSTRUCTING A PUBLIC RIGHT OF ACCESS TO
PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS: HOW SOUND IS
THE STRUCTURE?
"Without falling, no bridge, once spanned, can
cease to be a bridge."'
The last twenty years have witnessed increased litigation concerning
the scope of public access to various stages of civil and criminal proceed-
ings. While the Supreme Court has set standards for public access in
criminal trial2 and pretrial proceedings,3 lower courts have extended
these principles in a flurry of decisions recognizing public rights of access
to civil trials,4 pretrial discovery materials,5 and, most recently, pretrial
discovery proceedings.6
1. "The Bridge," FRANZ KAFKA: THE COMPLETE STORIES (G. Glatzer ed., 1946).
2. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); discussed infra notes 43-65 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984), discussed infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text. See also
Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) (defendant's sixth amendment rights violated when pretrial
suppression hearings were closed to public).
4. See, e.g., Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. Inc., 752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017 (1985); Wilson v. American Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568 (1lth Cir.
1985); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984), discussed infra notes 104-05;
In re Continental Ill. See. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1984), discussed infra notes 113-21; Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100
(1984).
5. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust and Say. Ass'n. v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assoc., 800 F.2d
339 (3d Cir. 1986) (settlement agreements); In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir.
1984); Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1984); American Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Grady, 594 F.2d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
MCI Communications Corp., 440 U.S. 971 (1979) (pretrial discovery must take place in public un-
less compelling reasons exist for denying the public access to the proceedings). See also A. Epstein,
Open Courts, Closed Trials, 13 LITG. 23, 26 (1987) (discovery materials-including depositions,
interrogatory answers, and documents-are presumptively open to the public); Note, Access to Pre-
trial Documents Under the First Amendment, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1813 (1984) (arguing first amend-
ment rights of access apply to pretrial documents and discovery).
6. Avirgan v. Hull, 118 F.R.D. 257 (D.D.C. 1987) discussed infra notes 12-30 and accompa-
nying text.
Generally, courts in reviewing public access to pretrial proceedings, presume the right of access to
discovery materials and then apply "good cause" analysis under Rule 26(c) to determine whether the
party opposing disclosure has shown sufficient threat of injury to close the information to the public.
While this analysis clearly applies to information filed into evidence with the court, the analysis
Washington University Open Scholarship
746 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 66:745
Several courts, without much discussion, have looked to Supreme
Court first amendment criminal trial access precedent,7 common law, 8 or
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure9 to embrace a presumptive public
right of access to pretrial discovery proceedings. 10 This Note addresses
first amendment, common law, and statutory lines of access analysis to
determine the soundness of recent decisions that presume a public right
of access to pretrial discovery proceedings. This Note also examines
whether such decisions further the policies underlying the established
principles of public access. Finally, this Note concludes that the public 1'
may have a non-presumptive right of access if a party can prove some
first amendment concern to override the presumptive closure of discov-
ery and pretrial discovery proceedings.
I. A VIRGAN V. HULL: THE RIGHT OF NONPARTIES
TO ATTEND DEPOSITIONS
In Avirgan v. Hull12 the district court for the District of Columbia
considered whether the press has a right to attend a pretrial deposition.
Avirgan was a civil Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO) suit 3 on behalf of two ABC journalists for injuries sustained
in the bombing of a Nicaraguan Contra leaders' press conference. 14 Co-
plaintiff, the Christic Institute, named twenty-nine defendants, several of
becomes less sound if applied to discovered information not entered into evidence, or to access to
discovery proceedings. See infra notes 147-61.
7. See Avirgan, 118 F.R.D. 257. See also Continental 11., 732 F.2d 1302.
8. See, eg., Bank of Am. Nat'l. Trust and Say. Ass'n. v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assoc., 800 F.2d
339 (3d Cir. 1986).
9. See, eg., Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010 .(D.C. Cir. 1984); American
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Grady, 594 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. American Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. MCI Communications Corp., 440 U.S. 971 (1979).
10. First amendment attorneys have noted that Avirgan, 118 F.R.D. 257, if followed, could
signal greater and more timely access by the press to court information. "Open Depositions to
Press?," 74 A.B.A. J. 22 (1988). Others have recognized Avirgan as an important first amendment
decision. Id. (Comments of John Koefl, attorney with Debevoise & Plimpton, New York and Ste-
phen Kohn, attorney for Avirgan intervenor Village Voice).
11. While this Note concentrates on a "public" right of access to discovery, most often the
press asserts this right on behalf of the public. Some decisions discussed in this Note refer to the
press' right of access. The press, however, merely asserts the public's right to access. Therefore, this
Note does not differentiate between the two. See infra note 31.
12. Avirgan appears in two opinions: 118 F.R.D. 257 (D.D.C. July 31, 1987) (Avirgan I) (con-
sidering access issue); 118 F.R.D. 252 (D.D.C. Dec. 9, 1987) (Avirgan II) (considering deponent's
showing of good cause).
13. See "RICO Suite Alleges Contra Ties," 73 A.B.A. J. 20 (1987).
14. Avirgan 1, 118 F.R.D. at 259.
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whom later emerged as important Iran-Contral affair figures.15 Plaintiffs
sought third party Glen Robinette's testimony. Robinette apparently
had accepted payments to develop vilifying information about the Chris-
tic Institute 6 in an attempt to undermine the original action, then pend-
ing in Florida. 7 The plaintiffs planned to take Robinette's deposition,
and arranged for reporters from seven major publications and news serv-
ices to view the deposition.18 Robinette moved for a protective order to
prevent press attendance at the deposition.1 9
In considering Robinette's motion, the Avirgan court first character-
ized the issue as whether a third party deponent may limit press and
public access to the deposition proceedings.2" The court cursorily re-
viewed Supreme Court decisions concerning public trial access21 and pro-
tective orders22 and concluded that, absent the deponent's showing of
15. Id. See "RICO Suit Alleges Contra Ties," 73 A.B.A. J. 20 (1987).
16. In June 1987, Robinette testified before the Iran-Contra Congressional Committee that he
had accepted money from Retired Major General Richard Secord to develop "derogatory" informa-
tion about Christie Institute attorneys. "Open Depositions to Press?" 74 A.B.A. J. 22 (1988).
17. Avirgan 1, 118 F.R.D. at 259.
18. The publications and news services were Time Magazine, U.S. News & World Report, The
Village Voice, Rolling Stone Magazine, the Washington Post, the Associated Press and the Religious
News Service. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 260. Robinette framed the issue differently: "whether the press should have access to
the deposition of a non-party." Id. at 260 n.4. The court rejected this statement of the issue as too
broad. The court rephrased the issue as one concerning the "right of the press, parties, and deponent
with regard to the taking of the deposition; the question of ultimate access to the information con-
tained in the deposition through the transcript as it is affected by the filing requirements .... I Id.
(emphasis in original). Thus, the court never explicitly decided the issue of "whether the press has a
right to attend a deposition when the press is not a party," but merely presumed such a right.
Avirgan 11, 118 F.R.D. at 255. The Court concluded that Rule 26(c) balances these first amendment
interests with the governmental interests. Id. at 257.
21. The court noted that the Supreme Court had recognized a constitutional right to attend
criminal trial proceedings only recently, and that the court has not yet extended the right to civil
trials. However, the court cited In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325
(D.C. Cir. 1985) discussed infra notes 122-29 and accompanying text, and concluded it would follow
the Supreme Court's "intimation" that the right applies to civil trials. Avirgan 1, at 260 n.5. Ulti-
mately, though, the court's decision turned on the protective order.
22. The court based its approach upon Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984),
discussed infra notes 88-99 and accompanying text. The court stated Seattle Times was directly on
point and rejected the Christie Institute's contentions that Seattle Times did not apply because the
Christie Institute was not a party asserting a right to disseminate as the news paper had been in
Seattle Times. Rather, the court claimed that the instant case involved the public's right to such
information. Avirgan 1, 118 F.R.D. at 260 n.6. The court apparently read Seattle Times as prohibit-
ing a party from closing a discovery proceeding to the public unless the party shows good cause. See
id. at 260-61; see also Avirgan I1, 118 F.R.D. at 253.
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"good cause" under Federal Rule 26(c), 23 a court should allow press at-
tendance.24 The court stayed its final decision and granted Robinette an
opportunity to show good cause for the protective order.25
In a later memorandum,26 the Avirgan court determined Robinette's
allegations of harm27 were insufficient to warrant a closed deposition.
21
Accordingly, the court denied Robinette's motion to exclude the press,
29
and also declined his request to supervise the deposition. 30
II. LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR PUBLIC ACCESS: THE SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS
The Supreme Court has grappled with issues of public and press 3t ac-
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Rule 26(c) provides in pertinent part:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good
cause shown, the court... may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, includ-
ing one or more of the following:... (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discov-
ery may be had only on specific terms and conditions...; (3) that certain matters not be
inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters; (4) that
discovery be conducted with no one present except person designated by the court; (5) that
a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court ....
24. Avirgan I, 118 F.R.D. at 261.
25. Id. at 262.
26. Avirgan II, 118 F.R.D. at 252.
27. Robinette alleged violation of his privacy, damage to his reputation as well as emotional
and monetary harm, in the forms of threatening letters and damaged business, as a result of media
attention. Robinette claimed the Christie Institute had distributed press releases "riddled with false
statements and accusations" in anticipation of his deposition. Id. at 254. He further averred media
attention had led to threatening phone calls and reluctancy of his clients to bring their matters to
him while he was the focus of media attention. Id.
28. The Avirgan court also cited Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) discussed
infra notes 88-98 and accompanying text, for the authority that the trial court has broad discretion
in determining whether a movant has shown good cause. Avirgan II, 118 F.R.D. at 255. The Avir-
gan court noted that Robinette focused on annoyance and harassment as a result of publication of
the case, and compared his allegations to those in Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 93 F.R.D. 471
(S.D.N.Y. 1982). The court concluded that, like Koster, Robinette had not established that the
information likely to be disclosed would be worthy of protection, or irrelevant to the action. Id. at
256.
29. Id. at 253.
30. Id. at 259 n.l.
31. This Note is mainly concerned with public access. However, public access issues arise most
often when a court excludes the press. The press has no greater right of access than does the public,
so that to litigate one is to litigate the other. See Nixon v. warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S.
589, 609 (1978); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972). See generally Lewis, A Public Right
to Know About Public Institutions: The First Amendment as a Sword, 1980 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 19-20
(Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) foreclosed any special right of access for the press).
On the dangers of recognizing a preferred status for the press, see Van Alstyne, The First Amend-
ment and Free Press: A Comment on Some New Trends and Some Old Theories, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV.
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cess to trials, and court-controlled access to information in a variety of
contexts. With each subsequent analysis, the Court has altered its focus
to recognize broader public interests in access. In early public trial deci-
sions, the Court grounded the right to a public trial not upon public
rights but upon the criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to be
heard before the public.32 Similarly, early cases addressing a party's ac-
cess to court records limited access to records pertinent to the party's
action.3" Over the years, the Court has shifted the focus of its access
analysis from protection of the defendant's right to a fair trial to a party's
need of evidence for trial toward recognition of the social utility of public
criminal trials, 4 and of public review of court documents.35
The Supreme Court first addressed public access to trials in Gannett v.
DePasquale.6 Gannett involved a nonparty newspaper who sought ac-
cess to both a criminal pretrial suppression hearing and the hearing's
transcripts.37 The Court found the trial court's exclusionary order valid
on sixth amendment grounds"8 because it protected the defendant's right
to a fair trial.39 The Court rejected the newspaper's contention that the
1, 19-23 (1980) (recognition of a specific press right of access would lead to government regulation of
press). But see Note: A Press Privilege for the Worst of Times, 75 GEO. L. J. 361, 366-72 (1980)
(discussing Press as the Fourth Estate Theory).
Similarly, the court has refused to prohibit the press from publishing information obtained in open
court. Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (courts may not restrict publi-
cation of minor's name and picture when the press obtained this information from an open hearing).
32. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (A judge's investigation and punishment of witness for
contempt must take place in open court, not in the judge's chambers).
33. See Exparte Uppercu, 239 U.S. 435 (1915) (party has a right of access to evidence on file
with a court from another action when that evidence pertains to his action).
34. Compare Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), discussed infra notes 36-42, with
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), discussed infra note 43-53 and accompany-
ing text, and Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court 457 U.S. 596 (1942), discussed infra notes 54-
65 and accompanying text.
35. Compare Ex parte Uppercu, 239 U.S. 435 (1915) (litigant has right to access evidence of
another action if the evidence pertains to his action) with Seattle Times, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (party
has qualified first amendment right to disseminate information to the public), infra notes 88-98, and
Nixon v. Warner Communications Co., 435 U.S. 589 (1978) (recognizing a common law right of
access to court records generally), infra notes 74-82.
36. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
37. Id. at 375.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.").
39. The order excluded the newspaper from the hearing. The trial judge, on reconsideration,
recognized that the press had a constitutional right of access to judicial proceedings but stressed that
the right should be balanced against a defendant's right to a fair trial. The jury found that the open
hearing would have posed a reasonable probability of prejudice to the defendants and refused to
Washington University Open Scholarship
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sixth amendment provides a public right to attend trials, 40 but reserved
judgment on the newspaper's first amendment argument, concluding that
the defendant's sixth amendment rights outweighed any first amendment
right the press might have.41 Despite the divergent grounds of the
Court's opinions, the Court demonstrated almost perfect alignment in
failing to adopt the newspaper's first amendment contentions.42
The Court recast its public access analysis in Richmond Newspaper,
Inc. v. Virginia.43 In Richmond, the Court held that a criminal trial must
be open to the public unless the trial court articulates an overriding inter-
est in closing the proceeding.' The Court posited three rationales for
the right of public access to criminal proceedings: historical practice, the
function of public trials and the first amendment. First, the Court noted
that historical evidence suggests Anglo-American criminal trials were
presumptively open.45 Originally, public criminal trials allowed the pub-
lic to vent community concerns, hostility and emotion over events affect-
vacate the exclusionary order, thus denying the newspaper a copy of the transcript of the proceeding.
443 U.S. at 376.
40. Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, stated that the sixth amendment does not create a
public right of access. Rather, its guarantee is "personal" to the accused, and is intended as a safe-
guard against possible abuses of the judicial process. 443 U.S. at 379-80.
The Court found a strong societal interest in public trials because openness may improve the
quality of testimony, induce unknown witnesses to come forward, cause each trial participant to
perform his or her duties more conscientiously and provide the public with an opportunity to ob-
serve the judicial system. On the other hand, this societal interest also extends to the constitutional
rights of the accused, such as swift and fair administration of justice, Id. at 383. The Court con-
cluded that the public interest in fair trials is fully protected by the participants in the litigation. Id.
at 384. While the Court did acknowledge a common law rule of open proceedings, it expressed
apprehension toward elevating the rule to the status of a constitutional right. Id. at 385.
41. Id. at 392-93.
42. The Justices wrote five separate opinions concurring only in the result. Chief Justice Bur-
ger's concurring opinion limited the holding to pretrial proceedings. Id. at 394 (Burger, C.J., con-
curring). Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion posited the press and the public have no right of
access under the first or sixth amendments. Id. at 404 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). In contrast,
Justice Blackmun, concurring and dissenting in part, joined by Justices Brennan, White and Mar-
shall, recognized a sixth amendment right of public access. Id. at 446-47 (Blackmun, J. concurring
and dissenting in part). Every Justice except Justice Powell either did not reach the first amendment
issue or declined to reach the first amendment issue or declined to reach the first amendment issue.
43. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
44. Id. at 581. In Richmond, the third retrial of a murder trial, the trial court had granted
defense counsel's closure motion with no objections from the prosecution or the newspaper whose
reporters were present before the trial began. Id. at 555.
45. Id. at 569. The Court traced public proceedings to years before the Norman Conquest, Id.
at 565, and chronicled their development from Blackstone and English common law to their incor-
poration into American law. Id. at 569-73.
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ing the community,46 and permitted public participation in government,
thus, minimizing public concern over unchecked judicial power.47 The
Court also articulated a function-based amendment rationale.4 8 The first
amendment, the court reasoned, protects the public's access to trials be-
cause the public has a first amendment right to receive information and
ideas as well as a right to assemble.49 Thus, the first amendment and its
concomitant public scrutiny of trials enhances the quality and integrity
of trials.5 0 Finally, the Court found the right to attend criminal trials
implicit in the first amendment guarantees.51 In stark contradiction to
Gannett, seven justices recognized a first amendment right of public ac-
cess 52 and one insisted that the right extends to civil trials as well. 3
In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court54 the Supreme Court reiter-
ated the Richmond approach and clarified its rationale. In Globe, a Mas-
sachusetts statute mandated public exclusion from alleged victims'
testimony in child sexual abuse trials.5 On its second hearing of Globe,56
46. This effect may be loosely termed the "cathartic" aspect of public trial. Its value is in
providing an outlet for the desire for retribution as an alternative to vigilante enforcement. Id. at
571.
47. Id. at 572. This aspect is really a combination of the educative aspect (public access to
trials educates the public in the workings of our justice system), the balance of power aspect (public
exposure curbs judicial power abuse through subjecting judicial acts to public exposure), and the
good faith aspect (public access to trials reinforces the public's faith and confidence that the justice
system is fair and just). Id. at 571-73.
48. Id. at 575-77.
49. Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion referred to the free speech clause, the press clause
and the right of assembly components of the first amendment, Id. at 577-78, and made mention of
the ninth amendment and supporting unenumerated fundamental rights, id. at 579 n.15, (thus "the
First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend free trials so as to give
meaning to those explicit guarantees"). Id. at 575. Thus, in the Chief Justice's opinion, the first
amendment provides protection necessary for its operation. Cf infra note 59 (Justice Brennan's first
amendment theory in Richmond).
50. 448 U.S. at 575-77.
51. Id. at 580.
52. The Court generally recognized the first amendment speech and press clauses were the basis
for any such right of access. Id. (Burger, J., plurality opinion); id. at 582 (White, J., concurring); id.
(Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 584 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 601 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in judgment). Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
However, on the basis of his concurring opinion in Gannett, Powell probably also would have recog-
nized the first amendment basis for access. See 443 U.S. at 403 (Powell, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 599 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment). Chief Justice Burger, writing for the
Court, stated that historically both civil and criminal trials were presumptively open, but added that
this case did not raise this particular question. Id. at 580 n.17.
54. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
55. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 278, § 16A (West 1981).
56. On the first hearing, the Court vacated the state supreme court's holding that closure was
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the Court rejected the lower court's first amendment analysis57 and held
the state statute unconstitutional.58 Initially, the Court noted that the
first amendment includes unenumerated first amendment rights which
are necessary to enjoy the enumerated first amendment rights. 9
The Court then reaffirmed the functional aspect of public criminal tri-
als because they ensure individual participation in government, and are
necessary to inform public decisions pertaining to governmental func-
tions.' The Court also employed the historical openness and public
quality control rationales of Richmond61 as further support, adding that
public access heightens public respect for the judicial process as well.62
The Court did not go so far as to hold the public's first amendment right
of access to be absolute. A court may close a criminal trial to the public
in order to inhibit disclosure of sensitive information, but its closure or-
der must meet strict scrutiny. 63 The Court ultimately found the Massa-
chusetts closure statute overbroad and thus unconstitutional. 6' Despite
this victory for the press, the Court did not extend its holding outside the
context of criminal proceedings.65
within the trial court's discretion and directed the state court to reconsider its decision in light of
Richmond, 449 U.S. 894 (1980).
57. The state court had recognized the historical openness of criminal trials, but noted an ex-
ception to the tradition of openness: cases involving sexual assaults. 383 Mass. 838, 845, 423 N.E.
2d 773, 777-78 (1981).
58. 457 U.S. at 610-11.
59. Justice Brennan tracked Chief Justice Burger's treatment of unenumerated first amendment
rights in Gannett, supra note 49, in which the Chief Justice noted that free access to proceedings
furthers the explicit first amendment guarantees of free speech, freedom of the press, and the right of
association. See Gannett, 448 U.S. at 577-78 (plurality opinion). Justice Brennan also added his own
first amendment theory: the first amendment protects those rights essential to republican govern-
ment. 457 U.S. 596 at 604-05. See also Brennan, Address, 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 173, 175 (1979)
(quoting, Time Inc., v. Hill 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967)) ("the guarantees of the first amendment 'are
not for the benefit of the press so much as for the benefit of all of us. A broadly defined freedom of
the press assures the maintenance of our political system and an open society.' ").
60. 448 U.S. at 604.
61. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
62. 448 U.S. at 605.
63. Id. at 606-07. The denial of access must be "necessitated by a compelling governmental
interest and ... narrowly tailored to serve that interest." Id. at 607.
64. Id at 608. The Court noted that if the court had reviewed on a case-by-case basis, it might
have been constitutional. 7d. However, because the statute closed all child testimony, it was not
"narrowly tailored." Id. at 609.
65. The majority opinion made no reference to applications outside the context of criminal
trials. Justice O'Connor's concurrence specifically limited the Globe and Richmond holdings to
criminal trials. Id at 611. Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Renquist, stated that although a
presumption of public openness of criminal proceedings exists, it is rebuttable. Id. at 619 (Burger,
C.L, dissenting). The Justices proposed a lower level of scrutiny for statutory closure: whether the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol66/iss4/4
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In the two subsequent cases, the Supreme Court extended the first
amendment rights of public access to pretrial proceedings in criminal tri-
als. In Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I)66 the Court
addressed the right of public access in voir dire hearings. The Court,
without reaching the first amendment claim,67 reiterated Globe's histori-
cal and functional approaches and reaffirmed the necessity of strict scru-
tiny to overcome the presumptive openness of criminal proceedings.68
In Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise IH)69 the Court
considered public access to pretrial suppression hearings. The Court
stressed the first amendment access right and clearly articulated a two-
prong test for public access to judicial proceedings. First, a court must
determine whether the proceeding has a "tradition of accessibility."7
Secondly, a court must look to whether public access plays a significant,
positive role in the process function as a whole.71 If these two factors are
affirmative, a qualified first amendment right of access attaches to the
process and a reviewing court will strictly scrutinize a closure order.72
In a related group of cases, the Supreme Court has addressed the right
of public access to court documents.73 In Nixon v. Warner Communica-
tions, Inc. ,' the Court considered whether the press had a common law
restrictions imposed are reasonable and whether the state's interests override the very limited inci-
dental effects of first amendment rights. Id. at 616. Justice Steven stressed that the Court had only
recognized a first amendment right of access to newsworthy matters. Id. at 620-21. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
66. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (Press-Enterprise 1).
67. See 467 U.S. at 509 n.8. But Justice Steven's concurring opinion urged that the decision
should rest on the first amendment. Id. at 516.
68. Id. at 510.
69. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (Press-Enterprise 1I).
70. Id. at 8.
71. Id.
72. "[T]he presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on
findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest." Id. at 9 (citing Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510).
73. Normally, in cases concerning public access to trials, access to document claims do arise.
This Note also addresses discovery, however, which encompasses both proceedings (e.g., deposi-
tions) and documents (e.g., interrogatories). Various commentators have recognized a correlation
between the Supreme Court's trial access and document access analyses. See Contemporaneous Ac-
cess to Judicial Records in Civil Trials, 9 WHITTIER L. REV. 67 (1987) (advocating application of
first amendment balancing test for access to court records); Note, Access to Pretrial Documents
Under the First Amendment, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1813 (1984) (same approach). But see Recent
Development, Public Access to Civil Court Records: A Common Law Approach, 39 VAND. L. REV.
1465 (1986) (arguing first amendment trial access decisions should not be applied to document ac-
cess issues).
74. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
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right, a first, or sixth amendment right75 to Watergate transcripts that
the trial court entered into evidence in a criminal trial. The Court re-
jected the press' common law and constitutional76 arguments. The Court
conceded a general common law right to inspect and copy public records
and documents. Such a right promotes the public's interest in observing
government's workings.77 Despite this interest, the common law right to
copy and inspect judicial records is not absolute. 78 Justice Powell, writ-
ing for the majority, stated courts have the inherent power to "insure
that ... [their] records are not used to gratify private spite or promote
public scandal" and that courts have refused to permit their files to serve
as "reservoirs of libelous statements for press consumption. ' 79  The
Court concluded that the decision to allow common law access to trial
documents is best left to the sound discretion of the trial court.
In addressing the press' first amendment press clause argument, the
Court conceded a court cannot prevent the press from publishing what it
had learned and what it was entitled to know. 0 Courts may not interfere
with the press when it publishes material already in the public domain.8
Because the public has no first amendment right of access to trial docu-
ments, the press also has none.82
The Supreme Court has also addressed an asserted first amendment
public right to receive information, or "right to know."83 While the
75. The press contended the sixth amendment required release of the Watergate tapes because
that amendment's requirement of public trials would not be met if the public's understanding of the
proceedings was incomplete. Thus, the press argued that the Court must allow the public to listen to
the tape to judge meaning from the speakers' inflection and emphasis. Id. at 610.
76. The Court found the sixth amendment right to public trial exists to protect courts from
becoming instruments of persecution. Id. In addition, the Court held that the sixth amendment
confers no special benefit on the press. Id. The amendment only protects the defendant by allowing
the public and press to attend the trial, but not to broadcast it. Id.
77. Id. at 597.
78. Id. at 598.
79. Id. (quoting excerpt from In re Caswell 18 R.I. 835, 836, 29 A.2d 259 (1893)).
80. 435 U.S. at 604.
81. Id.
82. Id. See also Recent Development, supra, note 73 (preferring Nixon common law approach
to recent federal appellate application of first amendment to civil court records access issue).
83. The "right to know" stems from Professor Alexander Meiklejohn's theory that the first
amendment protects the citizens' right to participate in America's democratic government. See A.
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). See also BeVier,
An Informed Public, An Informing Press: The Search for A Constitutional Principle, 68 CALIF. L.
REV. 482, 501-02 (1980); O'Brien, The First Amendment and the Public's "Right to Know," 7 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 579 (1980); Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1, 14-20.
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Court has long recognized a first amendment right to receive information
from a willing person,"4 the Court has been reluctant to establish a right
to know or a right to gather information for either the press or the pub-
lic.85 The Court has, to an extent, intimated a first amendment protec-
tion for news-gathering.86 The Court, however, has refused to extend a
first amendment right of access to government controlled information.87
84. See Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)
(first amendment right to receive commercial information); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396
(1974) (first amendment right to receive personal correspondence); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (right to receive information generally); LaMont v. Postmaster Gen., 381
U.S. 301 (1965) (first amendment right to receive political information).
85. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965). In Zemel, the plaintiff asserted a first amend-
ment right to gather information in Cuba about the overseas effects of government policies, despite a
government ban on trade with Cuba. Id. at 16. The Court held that no first amendment right
existed under the circumstances, and noted that if such a right existed, many individuals could raise
constitutional issues merely by alleging a decreased data flow. Id. at 16-17. The Court concluded:
"The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information."
Id. at 17.
However, the Court has softened its no "right to gather" approach in the dicta of more recent
cases. See, eg., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972) ("newsgathering is not without its
first amendment protection"); see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)
discussed supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text. Some commentators consider Richmond the
advent of first amendment right to know. See, e.g., Note, What Ever Happened to the "Right to
Know"?: Access to Government-Controlled Information Since Richmond Newspapers, 73 VA. L. REv.
1111, 1115 (1987). In addition, one court has read Globe as supplying reporters with "a right to
make the government give them access to nonpublic information." United States v. Dorfman, 690
F.2d 1230, 1233 (7th Cir. 1982). One court has gone even as far as applying first amendment analy-
sis to a photographer's "right to photograph" a rock concert despite a general "no-camera" rule.
D'Amario v. Providence Civil Center Authority, 639 F. Supp. 1538 (D.R.I. 1986).
86. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972). Branzburg involved a reporter's asser-
tion that the first amendment provided protection against a grand jury's efforts to force disclosure of
his sources. The Court rejected this argument, but noted some first amendment newsgathering pro-
tection. Id. at 700-09. See also Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978) ("an undoubted
right exists to gather news 'from any source by means within the law' ") (quoting Branzburg, 408
U.S. at 681-82); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (political objectives of first
amendment require access to information because "[p]ublic debate must not only be unfettered, it
must be well informed"). Id. at 862-63 (Powell, J., dissenting); Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368
(1979) (importance of the public's having accurate information concerning the criminal justice
system).
87, Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1978). The Court stated:
The [press] argument is flawed, not only because it lacks precedential support and is con-
trary to statements in this Court's opinions, but also because it invites the Court to involve
itself in what is clearly a legislative task .... Because the Constitution affords no guide-
lines, absent statutory standards, hundreds of judges would ... be at large to fashion ad
hoc standards... according to their own ideas of what seems "desirable" or "expedient."
Id. at 12-14; Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817
(1974) (no right of public access to prisons to interview inmates).
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In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart " the Court addressed a first amend-
ment issue related to document access. 89 In Seattle Times, Rhinehart, a
leader of a religious order, brought a defamation suit in Washington
State Court against a newspaper. 90 The newspaper subsequently discov-
ered, through requests for documents, the names of the order's mem-
bers.9" Rhinehart moved for and obtained a protective order under
Washington Civil Procedures Rule 26(c) to prevent the newspaper from
publishing the names.92 The newspaper claimed the protective order in-
fringed upon its first amendment right to disseminate information which
had been obtained in discovery. The Supreme Court rejected the news-
paper's challenge, noting that there is no unrestrained first amendment
right to gather information. 93 The court observed that parties obtain in-
formation only by virtue of liberal discovery rules which are a "matter of
legislative grace." 94 Thus, a litigant has no general first amendment right
of access to information made available for the sole purpose of trying his
suit.95 Further, the Court noted that pretrial depositions and interroga-
tions are not a public component of a civil trial.96
The Court avoided the newspaper's urgings to subject the protective
order to strict scrutiny as a prior restraint, and left the decision to the
discretion of the trial court.97 The Court concluded that when a court
enters a protective order on a party's showing of good cause, and does
not restrict information gained outside of discovery, the protective order
88. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
89. Any attempt to characterize Seattle Times as strictly an access case is unsound. Unlike true
access cases, the party newspaper had already obtained the information through discovery. Access
was not an issue; the issue was what a party could do with the information once obtained. See Note,
Access to Pretrial Documents Under the First Amendment 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1813, 183941 (1984)
(criticizing attempts to characterize Seattle Times as an access case).
90. 467 U.S. at 23.
91. Id. at 24.
92. The state rule was based on a similar provision in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; see
supra note 23.
93. 467 U.S. at 32.
94. Id.
95. However, he may publish that same information if obtained through other sources. Id.
96. "Discovery rarely takes place in public. Depositions are scheduled at times and places most
convenient to those involved. Interrogatories are answered in private." Id. at 33 n.19. See also
Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979). "[D]uring the last 40 years in which pretrial processes
have been enormously expanded, it has never occurred to anyone, so far as I am aware, that a
pretrial deposition or pretrial interrogatories were other than wholly private to the litigants. A pre-
trial deposition does not become part of a 'trial' until and unless the contents of the deposition are
offered into evidence." Id. at 396 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
97. Id. at 36.
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does not implicate the other party's first amendment rights.98 Because
Seattle Times concerned a party's limited right to disseminate discovered
information, it did not answer conclusively the issues of public access in
civil proceedings or public rights to discovered information.
Although the Supreme Court has accorded a qualified first amendment
status to public attendance at most criminal proceedings, it has expressed
ambivalence toward a public right of access to civil proceedings. 99 Fur-
ther, the Court has recognized only a limited press right to court docu-
ments. This lack of clear guidance has lead to a good deal of confusion
in the lower federal courts.
III. A VARIETY OF POSSIBLE STRUCTURAL CONFIGURATIONS FOR A
RIGHT OF PUBLIC ACCESS
In the wake of the Supreme Court's access decisions, the circuit courts
of appeal have addressed a variety of public access rights to trial and
pretrial proceedings, both civil and criminal. While some circuit courts
have recognized common law and first amendment rights of access to
various proceedings 1" and documents," 1 they have denied access to
98. Id. at 37.
99. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. See also Note, First Amendment Rights ofAccess
to Civil Trials After Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 51 U. CmI. L. REV. 1286 (1984) (Com-
mentator applies Globe and Richmond tests to civil trial and finds first amendment right).
100. See, e.g., Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1984) (first
amendment provides right of access to civil trials); In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302
(7th Cir. 1984) (presumptive right of access to proceedings in motion to terminate derivative claims
in shareholder derivative action); Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796 (1 lth Cir. 1983) (recognizing
press' right to attend civil suit regarding prison overcrowding); Bank of America Nat'l. Trust and
Say. Ass'n. v. Hotel Rittenhouse Associates, 800 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1986); Wilson v. American Mo-
tors Corp. 759 F.2d 1568 (1lth Cir. 1985). See also Note, A First Amendment Right of Access to
Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1163 (1984) (first amendment grants right of
access to post-investigatory disciplinary proceedings).
101. See United States v. Haller, 837 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1988) (first amendment right of access
extends to sealed plea agreements in criminal trial); FTC v. Standard Fin. Management Corp., 830
F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1987) (common law presumption of access attaches to financial statements used in
reaching settlement agreement); In re National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 828 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1987)
(qualified first amendment right of access attaches to documents and records pertaining to both
proceedings to disqualify judge and proceedings to inquire into attorney's conflict of interest in a
criminal trial); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986) (common law privilege of
access extends to materials used in determining the litigant's substantive rights); United States v.
Martin, 746 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1984) (common law access rights attach to tape transcripts not admit-
ted into evidence in a criminal trial); Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (common law-based presumption of public openness for discovery material extends to docu-
ments used at trial); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (Rule
26(c) creates a presumptive public openness of discovery).
Washington University Open Scholarship
758 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 66:745
other proceedings' 0 2 and documents.13 Courts have blended issues and
tests so that either result might be legally supportable. In an access deci-
sion, the outcome essentially depends upon whether the court character-
izes the asserted access right as a right to access proceedings or court
documents, or as a right to gather newsworthy information or dissemi-
nate information under a party's control.
In Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen 104 the Third Circuit recognized
a right of public access to civil trials. On the basis of Supreme Court
dicta, footnotes, and dissenting opinions, the Third Circuit applied the
Globe testl0 5 and determined the public has both a common law and a
first amendment right of access to civil trials.10 6 The court first noted the
right to attend civil trials existed throughout history and thus recognized
a common law right of access.10 7 The court also employed the Globe first
amendment test, examined the historical nature of civil trials and found
that they, like criminal trials, were historically open to the public.10 8 The
court then considered whether civil trials play "a significant role in the
functioning of the judicial process and as government as a whole."' 10 9
The Publicker court recognized that public access in civil trials enhances
the quality of court proceedings, heightens public respect for the judicial
process, and serves as a check against plenary judicial authority. 011 The
court, however, held that a court must show the denial "serves an impor-
102. First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1986)
(no first amendment right of access to judicial inquiry board proceeding); Westmoreland v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984) (first amendment articulates right to
attend a trial, but not a right to view them on the television screen).
103. The Courier-Journal v. Marshall, 828 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1987) (protective order with good
cause shown is sufficient to prevent non-party newspaper from obtaining Ku Klux Klan membership
list entered into discovery); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986) (common law
presumption of access to documents does not extend to materials used in discovery); United States v.
Beckham, 789 F.2d 401 (6th Cir. 1986) (constitutional right to attend criminal trials but not to copy
tape recordings entered into evidence therein); In re Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,
773 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (no first amendment or common law rights of access to prejudgment
discovery materials); Travoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (no first
amendment or common law right of access to discovery materials not used at trial); Belo Broadcast-
ing Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 1981) (no constitutional right of physical access to
courtroom exhibits).
104. 773 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984).
105. See supra notes 60-64, 70-72 and accompanying text.
106. 773 F.2d at 1071.
107. Id. at 1066-67.
108. Id. at 1068-69.
109. Id. at 1068.
110. Id. at 1069-70.
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tant governmental interest" and that no less restrictive way exists to
serve that interest.111 Curiously, the court recognized a good cause ex-
ception for court documents to the presumptive openness of civil pro-
ceedings but intimated the exception must also meet first amendment
scrutiny.1 12
Several circuits have made similar findings of a right of public access
to civil proceedings.1 13 However, the Third Circuit has restricted the
apparent breadth of the Publicker first amendment right of access by re-
jecting a right of access to judicial inquiry board proceedings.114 The
court has similarly rejected a general first amendment right of access to
government documents of general public interest.1 15
In In re Continental Illinois Securities Litigation 116 the Seventh Circuit
applied the policies underlying the Supreme Court criminal access deci-
sions to create a right of access to civil proceedings and documents.1 17 In
this shareholder derivative action, the district court granted access to a
litigation committee's report that it had used in reaching its conclusion
that the derivative action should continue. " 8 The committee obtained a
stay of the court's disclosure order and collaterally appealed, contending
that the district court erred in presuming a right of public access to pre-
trial proceedings in civil cases.119 The Seventh Circuit upheld the order
and pronounced that a presumption of public access inures to hearings
on motions to terminate and documents used in connection with those
hearings. 120 However, the court expressly reserved opinion upon access
in any pretrial stage other than a hearing on termination. 121
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Reporters
111. Id. at 1070.
112. Id. at 1073.
113. See supra note 4. See also Note, Publicker Industries v. Cohen: Public Access to Civil Pro-
ceedings and a Corporation's Right to Privacy, 80 N.W.U.L. REV. 1319 (1986).
114. First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry and Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467 (3d Cir.
1986).
115. Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1986).
116. 732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1984).
117. Id. at 1308-09.
118. Id. at 1306. The report was made in connection with a motion to terminate and recom-
mended that the trial court discuss all but one of the claims. After the court expressed its tentative
opinions about the use and the report, the parties settled. Id.
119. Id. at 1309.
120. Id. In particular, the court noted a motion to terminate was in essence, a "hybrid summary
judgment" with the same effect as a final hearing and thus, a greater reason for a presumption of
public access. Id.
121. Id. at 1309 n.10.
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Committee for Freedom of the Press, 22 considered an intervenor's123 as-
serted first amendment right of access to prejudgment documents in a
defamation action. The documents were the subject of a district court's
protective order.1 24 Judge Scalia, now Justice Scalia, first noted that the
intervenor had not pleaded a common law right of access, but a first
amendment right, and doubted whether even a common law right of pub-
lic access exists for prejudgment documents. 125 He further noted that he
could find neither historical authority for a general right of access to
prejudgment records, 126 nor any evidence that such access plays an es-
sential role in the functioning of the judicial process. 127 Judge Scalia
concluded that even if the functional justification of public trials were as
important in civil trials as in criminal trials, public access to prejudgment
documents would not enhance these interests.1 28 The court concluded
that the district court's refusal of access had not violated even a common
122. 773 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
123. Four individual newspaper reporters and an unincorporated association, the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, intervened in order to petition the district court to reconsider
its pretrial orders. Id. at 1327. The district court allowed intervention, but denied reconsideration.
Id.
124. Id. at 1326.
125. Id. at 1337. The court examined at length the "prejudgment rule" which states that as a
common law rule no public access to prejudgment records in a civil case exists. Id. at 1334. The
court cited a number of state and federal cases which opposed the prejudgment rule. On the other
hand, the court asserted that the "public records privilege" supports the prejudgment rule. The
public records privilege generally protects persons reporting public records from liability for defama-
tion. However, the privilege does not extend to prejudgment records. Judge Scalia concluded: "It
would be strange, if not unthinkable, to assess civil liability for bringing to the public's attention
government records which the public is entitled to see." Id. at 1335 (citations omitted).
126. The court examined several cases which cast doubt upon public access prior to judgment,
e-g., Ex parte Drawbaugh, 2 App. D.C. 404 (1894); Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392 (1884)
(Holmes, J.), and concluded that
[b]ecause of their sparseness [these] authorities.., are perhaps weak support for a general
common law rule of non-access to pre-judgment records in private civil cases. But when
laid beside our inability to find any historical authority, holding or dictum, to the contrary,
they are more than enough to rule out a general tradition of access to such records.
773 F.2d at 1335-36 (emphasis in original).
127. 773 F.2d at 1336-37. The court examined the Globe and Richmond functional assertions
that open trials preserve the integrity of factfinding, and the appearance of fairness function as a
check on judicial and governmental process, and play a cathartic role in permitting the community
to see justice being done. Id. The court concluded, "even assuming, as seems unlikely, that these
functions are as important as in the context of civil suits between private parties as they are in
criminal prosecutions, they are not greatly enhanced by access to documents... before judgment
rather than after." Id. (emphasis in original). For an opposing view to Judge Scalia's see Note,
Contemporaneous Access to Judicial Records in Civil Trials, 9 WHiTTIER L. REV. 67 (1987) (criticiz-
ing prejudgment rule and advocating In re Continental dissent's balancing test).
128. 773 F.2d at 1339.
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law right of access."'
Other circuits use a different test to determine whether a right of ac-
cess exists. These courts ignore the historical basis and functional justifi-
cation factors and simply judge the right of access upon the public
interest in access to the information. 130 If the public's interest in ob-
taining access outweighs the government's interest in refusing the right of
access, then the court recognizes the right of access.131
Most circuits after Seattle Times recognize a litigant has a first amend-
ment right to disseminate discovered information unless the trial court
has found good cause and accordingly entered a protective order under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). l3 2 In Anderson v. Cryovac,133 the
First Circuit adopted this approach to the litigants' first amendment
right to disseminate. Anderson was a class action against a chemical
company who had allegedly contaminated a town's water with toxic
chemicals. The press showed particular interest in this action and the
district court subsequently entered a protective order to prevent press
influence of prospective jurors.1 4 The court then allowed media produc-
tion companies to intervene and modified the protective orders to allow
general statements about the suit while still barring general distribution
of discovered information.13 5 Later, newspapers and television networks
obtained intervention, but the district court refused to grant access to the
protected information.' 3 6 The newspaper sought modification of the pro-
tective orders but the district court refused to modify them until final
disposition of the case.
The First Circuit reviewed Seattle Times and concluded that a protec-
129. Id.
130. See, eg., United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1983) (lack of historic tradition
does not bar no right of access); In re Consumers Power Co. Sec. Litig., 109 F.R.D. 45, 54 (D. Mich.
1985); Herald Co. v. Board of Paule, 131 Misc. 2d 36, 45-46,499 N.Y.S. 2d 301, 308 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
See generally Note, What Ever Happened to "The Right to Know"?: Access to Government-Con-
trolled Information Since Richmond Newspapers, 73 VA. L. REv. 1111 (1987).
131. See supra note 129.
132. In re Halkins, 598 F.2d 176, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("[W]ithout a protective order materials
obtained in discovery may be used by a party for any purpose including dissemination to the pub-
lic."). See supra note 23 for the text of FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
133. 805 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1986).
134. The original protective order prohibited the parties, their counsel, consultants and experts
from divulging any information obtained through discovery. Id. at 3.
135. Id. The court later modified the order again to allow the media production companies to
conduct interviews of the parties' attorneys, consultants and experts. Id.
136. The district court made available the documents it had used in deciding summary judg-
ment, but did not allow access to all discovered information. Id. at 4.
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tive order entered on good cause does not offend the first amendment if it
applies only to the discovery context and does not restrict dissemination
of information obtained from other sources. 137 The court then applied
this test and determined the district court's protective order passed mus-
ter under the "good cause" standard.138 Furthermore, the court then
applied the Richmond/Globe inquiry and determined there is neither a
first amendment nor a common law public right of access to documents
in civil discovery. 139
In sum, as a result of Seattle Times"0 most circuits recognize a first
amendment right of parties to disseminate discovered information which
a court may restrict only upon good cause shown and a narrowly drawn
protective order. However, in access litigation, there is a vast difference
between gathering information and spreading information obtained
through discovery.1 41 This treatment is consistent with Supreme Court
precedent.42 Despite expanded access rights to trials and expanded
rights to disseminate information, courts have shown reluctance to rec-
ognize a right to gather.143 While trials may be presumptively open and
courts may close them only after passing strict constitutional scrutiny, 144
court-imposed restrictions on dissemination require only a showing of
good cause and a narrowly drawn protective order.145 No circuit has
recognized a broad public or press right to gather information or pro-
posed a test to apply in such a situation. This trichotomy of access prece-
dent does not hold its separate doctrines distinct, and often leads to
confusing applications, especially in cases in which an intervenor asserts
a right to access discovery records or proceedings, or a litigant asserts a
right to share discovery. An asserted public right of access to attend
137. Id. at 6.
138. Id. at 7-8.
139. The court recognized that the public has common law and first amendment rights of access
to some parts of the judicial process, but held that the right does not extend to documents in connec-
tion with discovery proceedings. Id. at 10. The court reviewed public access decisions pertaining to
criminal trials, civil trials, criminal pretrial hearings and civil pretrial reports used in the disposition
of litigants' claims. Id. at 11. See supra notes 43-65 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 88-99 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
142. See Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17
(1965).
143. See supra note 85.
144. Press-Enterprise I, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
145. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. 20.
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pretrial hearings, obtain pretrial documents, or disseminate shared dis-
covery can also cause confusion.
IV. A PUBLIC RIGHT OF ACCESS TO DISCOVERY MATERIALS AND
PROCEEDINGS, CAN IT STAND?: AN ANALYSIS OF
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND PRECEDENT
Clearly, discovery is open to the parties in an action. The wording and
policy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure support such a proposi-
tion. 146 However, when an intervenor or an outsider to the action suc-
cessfully asserts a right of access to discovery materials or proceedings, a
broader sort of openness, an unprecedented public openness, results.
Because the Federal Rules state that all papers must be filed with the
court unless specified otherwise, 147 most discovery is eventually available
to the public. Thus, public access to pretrial proceedings or discovery is
usually only a question of how soon, and through what mechanisms, the
public may obtain access. Once a party enters discovery into evidence,
absent a protective order, the documents are subject to the public's com-
mon law right of access to court documents. 148 However, the basis for a
right of public access is more tenuous when a nonparty member of the
press or public asserts the right prior to the documents' admission into
evidence or filing. One can plausibly construe the common law right of
146. See 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: § 2041 (2d ed. 1987)
(referring to the provision which is now FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(5)).
Prior to 1970 the corresponding provision... stated 'that the examination shall be held
with no one present except the parties to the action and their officers or counsel.' By clear
negative implication this was read to mean that the parties, their officers and counsel could
not be excluded. This was a desirable result and there is no indication that the Advisory
Committee intended to change it when it as prepared.... [26(b)(5) FED. R. Civ. P.].
Id.
See also Kerschbaumer v. Bell, 112 F.R.D. 426 (D.D.C. 1986) (party may not exclude other party
from depositions absent clear allegations of serious harm). Contra Beacon v. R. M. Jones Apartment
Rentals, 79 F.R.D. 141 (N.D. Ohio 1978) (allowed party to have other parties in suit excluded from
depositions in order to ensure that witnesses would give independent testimony).
147. Rule 5(d) provides:
All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a party shall be filed.., either
before service or within a reasonable time thereafter, but the court may ... order that
depositions.., and interrogatories, requests for documents, requests for admissions, and
answers and responses thereto not be filed unless on order of the court or for use in the
pioceeding.
FED. R. Civ. P. 5(d).
148. See Nixon v. Warner Communications Co., 435 U.S. 589 (1978). See also 8 Wright &
Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: § 2042 at 298 (2d ed. 1987).
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access to attach when a court admits information into evidence149 or
when parties file information with a court.15 ° However, to allow public
access prior to filing, a different access right must exist for a third party
to gain access to discovery material. Because discovery involves docu-
ments, proceedings, and subject matter often of some interest to the pub-
lic, a public right of access to discovery might find justification in various
forms: through either a statutory or general presumption of discovery
open to the public; 51 by analogy to recognized rights of access; I 2 or
through recognition of a public "right to know" about matters bearing
on the public's governmental function.' 53 This section discusses these
possible bases for such a right of access to discovery.
A. Statutory Basis
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure introduced a liberal discovery
philosophy.154 They also provide the general standards that govern dis-
covery. 55 Unlike legislation regarding pretrial procedure in other con-
149. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(presumption of right of access applies to documents once an evidentiary hearing takes place).
150. See In re Continental I11. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (right of access
attaches when documents filed with court in connection with motion). See also In re Coord, 101
F.R.D. 34, 43 (D. Cal. 1984) (strong common law presumption of access attaches before judgment).
But see Simon v. G. D. Searle & Co., No. 4-80-160 slip op., (D. Minn. December 18, 1987) (no right
of contemporaneous access to materials filed with court).
151. See Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 1015-16 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding
statutory presumption under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of openness for discovery materials
whether used in trial or not); see also Avirgan I, 118 F.R.D. 257 (D.C.C. 1987), discussed supra notes
12-30 and accompanying text; In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1984),
discussed supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
152. These rights include: first amendment right of access to criminal trials and pretrial hear-
ings, see supra notes 36-72 and accompanying text; first amendment right of access to civil trials, see
supra notes 104-15 and accompanying text; common law right of access to court documents, see
supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text; first amendment right to disseminate information in one's
possession, see supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
154. The scope of discovery is very broad. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) provides in pertinent part:
Unless otherwise limited by order of the Court ... the scope of discovery is as follows:
(1) In general Parties may obtain any material, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action ... It is not grounds for objection that the
information sought will be inadmissible at trial if the information sought appears reason-
ably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (emphasis added). The liberality of the rules is intended to afford "each party
full access to evidence in the control of his opponent." Martin v. Reynolds Metals Corp., 297 F.2d
49, 56 (9th Cir. 1961). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 30(c) (discovery shall be had over objections)
(emphasis added).
155. See FED. R. Civ. P. 36-37.
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texts, the Rules contain no explicit provision that mandates presumptive
public openness of discovery materials or proceedings.1 5 6 Rule 26(c) 157
provides that a court may enter a protective order preventing dissemina-
tion of discovery and attendance of any person except those whom the
court specifies. Because Rule 26(c) provides some protection from expo-
sure, it seems to imply some presumptive access to proceedings from
which a party may need that protection.' 8 However the Rules do not
purport to regulate conduct of nonparties, 5 9 or to enlarge the substan-
tive rights of any person.'" Rule 26(c) exists merely to prevent party
dissemination to the public.161 Finally, the absence of any specific refer-
ence to public access to discovery or to pretrial proceedings casts further
doubt on the existence of such a statutory right of public access to dis-
covery proceedings or materials prior to filing.
B. Common Law Basis
As with statutory rights, a nonparty might assert a common law right
of access'62 to attend pretrial hearings or obtain transcripts of pretrial
hearings. The Supreme Court access decisions indicate, however, one
156. See, eg., The Publicity in Taking of Evidence Act, which provides that in antitrust suits:
"In taking of depositions of witnesses for use in any suit in equity brought by the United States
under Sections I to 7 of this title,... the proceedings shall be open to the public as freely as are trials
in open court." 15 U.S.C. § 30 (1970).
See also United States v. International Business Mach. Corp., 66 F.R.D. 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(Publicity in Taking Evidence Act requires that public access to documents made part of a deposi-
tion may only be limited by court order).
157. See supra note 23.
158. See, eg., American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Grady, 594 F.2d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied
sub nom. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. MCI Communications Corp., 440 U.S. 971 (1979) (construing
Rule 26(c): "As a general proposition, pretrial discovery must take place in public unless compelling
reasons exist for denying public access to the proceedings.). See also Green, The Folklore of Deposi-
tions, 11 Lrrso. 13 (1985) ("without a protective order in hand, a lawyer has no right to insist that
anyone, party or nonparty, be excluded from a deposition").
159. One notable exception exists: the Rules permit parties to involve nonparties in discovery,
see FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a), 30(d), 31(a), 34, and allow sanctions against nonparties for non-coopera-
tion. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (court may grant order and compel discovery or find defendant in
contempt).
160. See 28 U.S.C. § 2070 ("The Rules [of Civil Procedure] shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify
any substantive right .... ").
161. See In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d 352, 356-57 (1lth Cir. 1987). Courts
have recognized that, absent a protective order, the Rules do not prohibit discovery sharing, Johnson
Foils, Inc. v. Huyck Corp., 61 F.R.D. 905, 910 (N.D.N.Y. 1973), and that the Rules comprehend
shared discovery in order to expedite trial preparation. Williams v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 50
F.R.D. 31, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
162. See supra notes 74-82.
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may not successfully assert a common law right of access unless the right
of access existed at common law or, in the Court's words, the right of
access has a "historical basis." '163 While at common law most proceed-
ings were open and nonparties could obtain access to trials and docu-
ments, 1" discovery itself was not open.1 65 In fact, prior to the current
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, judiciary statutes did not provide for
protective orders because discovery was much narrower.1 66 In addition,
the Supreme Court has indicated discovery was not historically open. 167
163. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text. Commentators have criticized the Court's
historical tradition prong because the Court has not determined what constitutes a sufficiently his-
torical basis or what tradition a court should consider. See Note, What Ever Happened to "The
Right to Know?" Access to Government Controlled Information Since Richmond Newspapers, 73 VA.
L. REv. 1111, 1130 (1987).
164. English common law recognized a public right to attend trials. See Collier v. Hicks, 2 B &
AD, 663, 667 (1831); Daubney v. Cooper, 10 B & C 237, 240 (1829); see also 14 HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 181-82 (Ist ed. 1964). But see Ogle v. Branding, 2 Russ. & M. 688
(1831) (judge may order private trial despite one party withholding consent).
Earlier American law also recognized open judicial proceedings. See Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137
Mass. 192 (1884) (Holmes, J.)
It is desirable that the trial of causes should take place before the public eye, not because of
the controversies of one citizen and public concern, but ... that every citizen should be
able to satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is
performed.
Id. at 394.
Although English common law cases forbid access to judicial records, see Browne v. Cummings,
10 B & C 70 (1829), early American cases recognized such a right of access; see, e.g., Ex parte
Uppercu, 239 U.S. 435, 440 (1915) (litigant has right to obtain access to records containing avidence
material to his case); Ex parte Drawbaugh, 2 Ct. App. D.C. 404, 406. (1894) (records on appeal,
upon filing, become subject to public inspection); Note, ,4l Courts Shall be Open: The Public's Right
to View Judicial Proceedings and Records, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 311 (1979) (discussion of historical devel-
opment of common law right of access, including discussion of civil trials at 320-22).
Currently, FED. R. Civ. P. 77(b) provides that all trials are to be held in open court. FED. R. Civ.
P. 43(a) indicates that testimony at trial should be public.
165. This is clearly the case in English common law. Publication of any matter pertaining to the
trial before trial was grounds for contempt. See In re Cheltenham and Swansea Ry. Carriage and
Wagon Co., 8 L.B. 580 (1869).
Similarly, in the United States courts, under the Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1798, 30th Sec., Vol. 1
p.68, depositions were to be taken before a judge and sealed until opened in court. In fact, if a
deposition was opened out of court, the deposition was inadmissible for any purpose. See Beale v.
Thompson & Maris, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 70 (1814) (Story, J.).
166. Historically, courts would allow depositions of witnesses only when the parties could not
secure their testimony in court either because the defendant would be unavailable because of absence
(deposition de bene esse) or inconvenience (deposition in perpetuam). See 28 U.S. REv. STAT.
§§ 644-46 (1934); 2 M.U.S.C.A. §§ 639, 644 (1926); 13 U.S. REv. STAT. §§ 863-66 (2d ed., 1874).
Subsequent code revisions allowed a much broader scope for depositions. See 28 U.S.C. Rules 26-36
(1946); FED. R. CIV. P. 30-32 (1985).
167. Press-Enterprise I, 478 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1984) (Stevens, J., Dissenting) (pretrial proceeding
not historically open). Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984) (discovery rarely takes
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Finally, court of appeals are undecided in regard to whether a common
law right of access attaches to documents not admitted into evidence.168
C. First Amendment Basis
The public might also assert a first amendment right of access to at-
tend pretrial proceedings. As noted above, the first amendment right of
access only extends to judicial proceedings. 69 Furthermore, as Globe
and the Press-Enterprise cases indicate, one prerequisite to asserting a
first amendment right to attend is a showing that the proceeding in ques-
tion was historically open. 170 Precedent and reason force the conclusion
that if no common law right of access to the proceeding exists, no first
amendment right can either. 171
In addition, under the "public function" prong of the first amendment
test, the public value of discovery does not rise to the level of importance
that the public value of trials does. On the one hand, information related
to the judicial process would serve the public's interest in observing the
system of justice and providing a check against misuse of judicial
power. 172 However, the public's interest in openness in civil pretrial pro-
ceedings and discovery must be subordinate to the government's interest
in both maintaining discovery's liberality173 and preventing undue press
and public interference with the fair and orderly disposition of a private
dispute. 174 Public access to discovery might provide the public with in-
formation helpful to making political decisions. However, because the
information in discovery is not yet clearly associated with the facts of the
case and because liberal rules permit discovery of a broad area of infor-
place in public); Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 396 (1979) (Burger, CJ., concurring) (pre-
trial depositions and interrogatories are wholly private to litigants). See generally Marcus, Myth &
Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1983).
168. Compare In re Reporters for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1985), with In
re Continental Ill. See. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1984).
169. See Fenner & Koley, Access to Judicial Proceedings: To Richmond Newspaper and Beyond,
16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 434 (1981) (pretrial depositions and interrogatories are non-judi-
cial proceedings, thus no first amendment access right exists). But see Comment, Non Party Access
to Depositions in Florida, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 157, 167-68 (1984) (while depositions are non-
judicial, they may have substantial impact on outcome if involved in pretrial termination).
170. See supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text.
171. See In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d 352, 355 (11th Cir. 1987) (no common
law or first amendment rights of public access attach to discovery prior to entry into trial record).
172. See Fenner & Koley, supra note 169, at 435-36.
173. See Marcus, supra note 167.
174. Id.
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mation of questionable relevance and meaningfulness to the trial," 5 pub-
lic access provides a means by which the public may obtain
misinformation rather than information relevant to the case. When ac-
cess to discovery reaches irrelevant or even tangentially relevant informa-
tion, the public function policy underlying access loses its justification., 76
Then, the right of access becomes a right to obtain unexpurgated and
unevaluated information about parties and nonparties prior to any find-
ing of relevancy or credibility.
D. Dissemination of Information
Through Seattle Times, however, a party may have a limited first
amendment right to disseminate information obtained through discov-
ery. 1 77 If a party chooses to give information to a non party when no
protective order bars discovery sharing, first amendment rights attach to
the information.' 7  A court may only prohibit the public dissemination
of the information in the possession of the press if the order will pass
strict scrutiny. 179 On the other hand, because parties possess information
by virtue of liberal discovery, a court may restrict their first amendment
free speech rights through a protective order entered for good cause
shown.' 80 Thus party dissemination has only qualified first amendment
protection. Because parties do not possess discoverable material prior to
a deposition hearing, however, dissemination does not include the power
to grant a nonparty access to a deposition or proceeding. A party may
175. Depositions especially tend to be overbroad. Usually only a small portion of discovery is
ever admitted at trial. See Hazard, Depositions: Modern Day Inquisitions, 10 NAT'L L.J. 13-14
(March 14, 1988) ("[d]epositions often become nothing more than verbal sparring matches devoid of
a useful product" and often result in badgering and irrelevancies).
176. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 893 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983)
("Discovery involves the use of compulsory process to facilitate orderly preparation for trial, not to
educate or titillate the public .... At the adjudication stage, however, very different considerations
apply. An [adjudication] should be subject to public scrutiny.") Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n,
635 F.2d 1295, 1299 n.7 (7th Cir. 1980) ("If the purpose of the common law right of access is to
check judicial balances, then the right should only extend to materials upon which a judicial decision
is based.").
177. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
178. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (criminal sanctions
may not be imposed upon nonparticipants for publishing truthful information regarding confidential
judicial inquiry proceedings); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977)
(press may not be prohibited from publishing information gathered in open court); accord Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 426 U.S. 539 (1976).
179. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text. See also Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467
U.S. 20, 34 (1980).
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share information with a nonparty, 18' but that does not include confer-
ring access rights upon that nonparty.
E. Policy Concerns
Aside from the lack of statutory or precedential support for the right
of access, policy also weighs against a public right of access to pretrial
proceedings and discovery. Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of a pub-
lic access to discovery is the potential for private abuse. Unlike trials,
courts rarely supervise depositions. 82 The parties may try to manipulate
the press by badgering, irrelevancies and grandstanding,183 to which the
deponent may only note an objection.814 Parties and their counsel often
attempt to utilize press coverage in their trial strategy. Certainly, "good
press" or "bad press" can influence potential jurors or possibly even the
judge's perception of society's values upon which the judge might rely.'85
In addition, the Supreme Court has intimated that our system does not
favor trial by press over trial by jury. 86 Similarly, threats of admitting
the press to depositions and discovery at the early stages of trial could
force parties to settle, not necessarily on the merits of their case, but
because a nonparty may not want damaging information of little or no
relevance to the action exposed to the public.' 87
However liberal discovery rules may be, courts recognize that the first
181. See supra note 161.
182. FED. R. Civ. P. 28(a).
183. See Hazard, Depositions: Modern-Day Inquisitions, 10 NAT'L L.J. 13-14 (March 14, 1988)
(discussing common deposition tactics).
184. Clearly, unlike trial, an immediate ruling on admissibility is not possible at a deposition;
thus an objection goes to the record and the deponent must respond whatever the question. FED. R.
Civ. P. 30(c). See Ralston Purina Co. v. McFarland, 550 F.2d 967, 969 (4th Cir. 1977) (failure to
answer is inappropriate following objection). But see Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers'
Local Union No. 130, 657 F.2d 890, 903 (7th Cir. 1981) (deposition evidence is taken subject to
objection, but where questions go beyond reasonable limits, refusal may be justified), cert. denied sub
noa. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130 v. Plummes, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982).
185. Some courts have recently found that media coverage does not necessarily prejudice the
jury, ag., CBS Inc. v. United States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 729 F.2d 1174, 1179 (9th
Cir. 1984) (Notwithstanding heavy media exposure "many, if not most, potential jurors are un-
tainted by press coverage."); In re National Broadcasting Co., 635 F.2d 945, 948 (2d Cir. 1980)
(Even after heavy media coverage, only one-half of prospective jurors had heard of Abscam and of
that half very few recalled specifically what it was all about.).
186. "Legal trials are not like elections, to be won through the use of the meeting-hall, the radio
and the newspaper." Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 281 (1941).
187. See Hazard, Depositions: Modern-Day Inquisitions, 10 NAT'L L.J. 13-14 (March 14, 1988).
"[Most judges consider discovery to be preliminary and incidental; whereas for litigators discovery
Washington University Open Scholarship
770 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 66:745
amendment does not include a right to gather information.188 On the
other hand, the first amendment does recognize some public interest in
information particularly important to the governmental function of the
well informed populace.189 While no right may exist to gather discovery
information, courts may find it necessary in certain circumstances to rec-
ognize the importance of contemporaneous public access to the
information.
V. CONCLUSION: A PRESUMPTION OF PUBLIC CLOSURE
This Note has shown that the approach taken in Avirgan v. Hull' 90 is
unsupportable and dangerous. Both history and Supreme Court prece-
dent fail to support a presumptive right of access to either pretrial pro-
ceedings or discovery materials prior to filing.' 9' In fact, both history
and common law support closure of civil pretrial proceedings and discov-
ery.' 92 The lower court decisions that extend the first amendment right
of public access from criminal proceedings to civil trials may have
reached results consistent with history and precedent. Indeed, civil trials
appear to have been historically open to the public.193 In addition, public
is central and predominant... Judges have trial in mind; litigators have in mind that most cases are
settled before trial, on the basis of the depositions." Id. at 14.
See also Kaufman, JudicialReform in the Next Century, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1976) (the author,
a federal judge, views high rate of settlements as indicative of party extortion via discovery tactics);
Note, Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 1001 (1961) (discovery is "delib-
erately employed to delay the litigation, harass adversaries, or extort a settlement"); Recent Devel-
opment: Public Access to Civil Court Records: A Consumer Law Approach, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1465,
1498 (1986) (access to court documents often forces parties to settle on grounds unrelated merits of
case).
188. "To claim a value in access to information comparable to the value of freedom of expression
is to ignore 200 years of First Amendment Jurisprudence." In re Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93, 100 (2d
Cir. 1984); see supra notes 83-87; see also Legi-Tech v. Keiper, 601 F. Supp. 371, 377 (N.D.N.Y.
1984) (denial of access does not impinge upon freedom of speech); Epstein, Open Courts, Closed
Tials, 13 LrrG. 23 (1987).
189. See Globe, 457 U.S. at 605-06 (Brennan, J., majority); Gannett, 443 U.S. 368 (1978) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting); Brennan, Address, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173, 176 (1979) (first amendment
protects public's function in republican form of government). But see Capital Cities Media, Inc. v.
Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1167 (3d Cir. 1986) (The first amendment operates only by barring govern-
ment interference with the flow of information and ideas to the public.).
190. See supra notes 12-28 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 189-203. See also Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, (1979) (pretrial
depositions and interrogatories are wholly private to litigants) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
192. See supra notes 164-67.
193. See supra note 164.
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attendance at civil trials may provide protection against judicial tyranny
and may enhance the public's evaluation of the judicial system.
On the other hand, courts that have recognized public rights of access
to civil discovery and pretrial proceedings in the absence of any common
law or statutory support have, in essence, created a general first amend-
ment right to gather information. Such a first amendment right extends
beyond the support of historical practice, the language of the first amend-
ment, its interpretation by the Supreme Court, and the policy underlying
general first amendment rights of access to criminal and civil
proceedings.
If courts are to determine discovery and civil pretrial proceedings are
open to the public, the first amendment will not be a satisfactory vehicle
to reach this result. Because discovery and pretrial proceedings are not
presumptively open, courts should not place the burden of proof upon
the party or deponent who seeks to close the proceeding to the general
public. Rather, a court should place the burden of overcoming presump-
tive closure upon the party seeking public attendance when its opponent
resists public attendance. A trial court exercises plenary power over dis-
covery and the conduct of proceedings before the court. If a party
desires to open a proceeding or discovery to the public, that party should
only be allowed to do so if it can show the court good cause to overcome
the presumptive closure of discovery.
Rather than stretching the first amendment access and dissemination
rights beyond their tolerance, the presumptively closed approach to pre-
trial proceedings accords proper deference to history and precedent.
More importantly, perhaps, the presumption of closed discovery mini-
mizes public disclosure's adverse impact upon liberal and efficient discov-
ery, and discourages litigant abuse of public attendance for the purpose
of harassing parties or third parties during discovery.
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